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Abstract
We develop a model of asymmetric reciprocity and optimal wage setting based on
contractual incompleteness, fairness, and reference dependence and loss aversion in
the evaluation of wages by workers. The model establishes a positive wage-effort
relationship capturing a worker’s ‘asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity’, in
which loss aversion implies negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity.
Our theory provides an explanation for the observed asymmetry and dynamics of
workers’ reciprocity and establishes a micro-foundation for downward wage rigidity,
the implications of which shed new light on a forward-looking firm’s optimal wage
setting and hiring decisions.
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1 Introduction
There is an emerging consensus in the literature that behavioural concerns such as fair-
ness, workers’ morale and reciprocity influence firms’ wage setting behaviour (Fehr et al.,
2009). These aspects are also considered to be the key behavioural forces that underlie
the observation of downward wage rigidity: compensation managers may refrain from cut-
ting wages following adverse economic conditions if they believe this will negatively affect
workers’ morale and effort (Bewley, 2007). Inspired by these ideas, we develop a theory of
asymmetric reciprocity and downward wage rigidity based on contractual incompleteness,
fairness, and reference dependence and loss aversion in the evaluation of wage contracts by
workers.
The theory sheds light on the sources of asymmetry and dynamics of workers’ reci-
procity documented by the empirical literature; and on its implications for optimal wage
setting and the employment contract. In particular, the paper makes the following contri-
butions: i) it offers a psychological foundation—based on loss aversion and reference wage
adaptation—for the observed asymmetry, and temporary nature of, workers’ reciprocity; ii)
it provides a transparent, and plausible, theoretical micro-foundation for dynamic down-
ward wage rigidity; iii) it sheds new light on the implications of ‘asymmetric reference-
dependent reciprocity’ and wage rigidity for a forward-looking firm’s optimal wage setting
and hiring decisions. The paper contributes to a large body of literature that has consid-
ered the implications of reciprocity, loss aversion, and downward wage rigidity in labour
markets1 by developing a tractable microeconomic model that allows a rigorous analysis of
the asymmetries and irreversibility of wage and effort dynamics, and of their implications
for the nature of the employment contract. We believe that gaining a deeper understanding
of the incentives driving workers’ and firms’ behaviour when engaged in employment rela-
tionships is also particularly important in light of recent advances in the macroeconomic
theory of labour market fluctuations (Elsby et al., 2015).
1This literature spans from the first efficiency wage models developed by Akerlof (1982) and Akerlof and
Yellen (1990), to the model of Bhaskar (1990) and to more recent applications of fairness and reciprocity in
labour markets, such as, Danthine and Kurmann (2007), Eliaz and Spiegler (2014), and Benjamin (2015).
In Section 4 we provide an extensive discussion of this literature, [which, since the first version of our
paper appeared in July 2015 (SIRE Discussion Paper SIRE-DP-2015-57), has been growing fast (see for
instance Ahrens et al. (2015), Kurmann and McEntarfer (2017), Sliwka and Werner (2017), Kaur (2018)
and Macera and te Velde (2018)).]
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The basic premise of our theory is that there is contractual incompleteness over effort
(Williamson, 1985); and that workers evaluate wage contracts relative to a reference ‘fair’
wage. Central to our model is the inclusion of a ‘morale function’ in the worker’s payoff,
which consequently exhibits both positive and negative reciprocity stemming from their
reference-dependent preferences: a wage above the reference wage increases morale and
triggers supra-normal effort; a wage below the reference wage reduces morale and triggers
sub-normal effort. This establishes a positive wage-effort relationship where, if the worker
is loss averse, negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity. To the best of our
knowledge our paper is the first that formally derives a link between reference dependence,
loss aversion and the asymmetric nature of reciprocity from a worker’s optimal behaviour.
Although the relationship between loss aversion and negative reciprocity has already been
conjectured in the empirical literature (see e.g. Fehr et al. (2009)), we think that rigorously
formalising this idea will not only enable us to transparently analyse the implications of loss
aversion for optimal wage setting, but will also allow us to derive new testable hypotheses.
In addition we show that if a worker uses the past wage as their reference for fairness,
any reciprocity response triggered by an initial wage change will eventually disappear—
reciprocity in our model is a temporary phenomenon. This implication is consistent with
evidence on the dynamics of workers’ reciprocity and supports the interpretation according
to which reciprocity is temporary due to dynamic adaptation of the reference wage (see,
for instance, Gneezy and List (2006), Mas (2006), and Sliwka and Werner (2017)).
In the second main contribution of the paper we explore the implications of the asym-
metry and dynamics of reciprocity just discussed in a two-period employment relationship
in which the evolution of the job-match productivity is uncertain. First, we show that in
a situation in which the firm is facing a negative shock and has an incentive to decrease
the worker’s wage, consideration of the relatively large impact of negative reciprocity on
output gives rise to downward wage rigidity for a range of negative shocks.2 Importantly,
this is not a static result: due to the worker’s adaptation to wage increases during periods
2Downward (nominal and real) wage rigidity is the tendency of wages to not fall during recessions. It
has been widely documented in the empirical literature by looking at wage change distributions, which
exhibit a high incidence of wage freezes with wage cuts less frequent than wage increases (see e.g. Nickell
and Quintini (2003), Fehr and Goette (2005), Dickens et al. (2007)). Evidence that firms avoid cutting
wages during recessions has also been reported by several field surveys (see, for instance, Campbell and
Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1999), Agell and Bennmarker (2007), Babecky´ et al. (2010)).
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of expansion, the firm will face the trade-off between wage cuts and negative reciprocity
whenever, in any subsequent period, it is confronted with negative shocks. Downward
wage rigidity may arise even at wage levels substantially higher than those with which the
employment relationship had initially started. As we discuss in our analysis we identify an
asymmetric adjustment cost around the past wage as a necessary ingredient for models of
dynamic downward wage rigidity (such as Elsby (2009), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) and
Kaur (2018)). In our model these features are captured by the worker’s dynamic adaptation
of the reference wage, and the relatively large cost to the firm of negative reciprocity (that
stems from loss aversion). As such our paper contributes to this literature by providing a
plausible and transparent micro-foundation for dynamic downward wage rigidity.
Moreover, we study how a forward-looking firm’s expectation of negative reciprocity
and downward wage rigidity can affect the determination of the optimal hiring wage. This
analysis is important in understanding whether the expectation of future downward wage
rigidity also implies a more compressed wage growth throughout the employment relation-
ship. While the literature on this subject has established that such an expectation leads
to compression of wage increases (see Elsby (2009) and Benigno and Ricci (2011)), in con-
trast we show that this prediction is not robust in our model: a firm that expects to be
more constrained by downward wage rigidity in the future is also facing a greater ex ante
probability of subsequently laying off the worker. This reduces the expected duration of
the employment relationship, and will therefore partially offset the incentive to compress
wage increases to keep their worker’s wage and reference wage low in the future.
Finally, we explore how these considerations affect the firm’s hiring decisions through
the influence on the firm’s expected value of the employment relationship. We find that
independently of whether the initial hiring wage is compressed by the firm, the expecta-
tion of downward wage rigidity—and the anticipation of stronger negative reciprocity—
unambiguously reduce the value of a new employment relationship, implying that the firm
will hire less on average. This result contributes to the literature concerned with the ef-
fects of incumbent workers’ downward wage rigidity on job creation (see the discussion in
Elsby et al. (2016)) and suggests that expected rigidities in the wage of existing/incumbent
workers can negatively affect firms’ incentives to hire.
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The outline of the paper is as follows. We set out our model of asymmetric reference-
dependent reciprocity and optimal wage setting in Section 2. In Section 3 we explore the
properties of the model for wage and effort dynamics, and we study their implications
for the nature of the employment contract. Section 4 provides a discussion of the related
literature and highlights our main contributions, and Section 5 offers some concluding
remarks. All proofs are contained in the appendix.
2 Basic Set-Up
We begin by considering an established worker-firm employment relationship for a single
employment period to illustrate the mechanisms at work. We assume a setting of complete
information. The worker is assumed to be reference dependent and loss averse: they eval-
uate wage contracts in relation to a reference ‘fair’ wage, which captures their perception
of fairness and is taken as exogenous for the purpose of this section. A wage below the
reference wage is perceived as unfair, while a wage above is perceived as a gift. At the start
of the employment period the firm learns the (non-negative) match productivity and the
worker’s reference wage, and subsequently decides on the profit-maximising wage. After
observing the wage and evaluating it in relation to their reference wage, the worker decides
on the utility-maximising level of effort that generates output for the firm. Payoffs are
then realised.
Wage setting is thus formalised as a sequential-move game in which the firm (the first
mover) makes a take-it-or-leave-it wage offer to the worker (the second mover). Since the
worker’s belief of what should be a ‘fair’ wage is independent of the firm’s actions, and
the firm is assumed to be motivated only by profit, the game can be solved by backward
induction.3
3In contrast to more general applications of ‘psychological game theory’ to intentions-based reciprocity
(e.g., Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004), in our model reciprocity is only on the side of the
worker (as is also the case in Danthine and Kurmann (2007) and Benjamin (2015) in the labour market
literature); and the worker’s perception of fairness is determined by a comparison of the wage to a wage
they consider as fair—given by the reference wage—that is independent of the actions the firm could have
taken had it not paid its chosen wage. As such, we do not need to consider beliefs, which would be necessary
if we construct the fair wage from what could otherwise have been chosen. Nevertheless, the firm’s choice
of the wage conveys intention from the worker’s perspective, and the firm’s ‘kindness’ or ‘unkindness’ is
judged by the worker in terms of whether the wage offer is above, equal, or below the reference wage.
Whilst this is a straightforward conception of reciprocity, it is rich enough to allow us to capture many
salient features of the employment relationship, and allows us to use simple backward induction to solve
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2.1 Payoffs
We let e denote effort of the worker, w the wage paid, r the reference wage, and q the
match productivity. The instantaneous profit function of the firm is given by
π(w; q, e) = y(q, e)− s(w), (1)
where y is the per-worker output (the price of which is normalised to one) and s is the
per-worker cost of production. We make the following assumptions:
F1. s′ > 0 and s′′ = 0.
F2. ye, yq > 0, yee, yqq ≤ 0 and yqe > 0.
We specify the worker’s preferences by an additively separable utility function
u(e;w, r) = m(w)− d(e) +M(e;w, r), (2)
where m captures the worker’s evaluation of the wage; d represents the worker’s intrinsic
psychological net cost of productive activity;4 and M is the ‘morale function’ that depends
on the worker’s evaluation of the wage in relation to the reference wage:
M(e;w, r) ≡ e · n(w|r). (3)
We assume that n(w|r) ≡ µ(m(w) − m(r)) where µ is a gain-loss value function that
exhibits loss aversion in the spirit of Kahneman and Tversky (1979) and Tversky and
Kahneman (1991).
We impose the following assumptions:
W1. m′ > 0 and m′′ < 0.
W2. d′(0) < 0 and d′′ > 0.
W3. µ is piecewise-linear with µ(0) = 0 and µ′(−x)/µ′(x) ≡ λ ≥ 1 for any x > 0.
the game.
4For instance: d(e) = c(e) − b(e), where c and b are respectively the physical/psychological cost and
benefit of effort.
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Assumption W2 implies that u(e;w, r) is strictly concave in e, so that for each wage
and reference wage combination there is a unique utility-maximising level of effort (and
also that ‘normal’ effort—when the wage is equal to the reference wage—is positive, as we
subsequently discuss). Assumption W3 closely resembles the assumptions of Ko˝szegi and
Rabin (2006) over the properties of their universal gain-loss function, except we do not
have diminishing sensitivity. It follows that the gain-loss utility takes the form:
n(w|r) =
 η[m(w)−m(r)] if w ≥ r andλη[m(w)−m(r)] if w < r, (4)
where η > 0 is a parameter that captures the importance of gain-loss utility and λ ≥ 1
represents the worker’s degree of loss aversion.
The morale function in (3) captures the psychological cost/benefit of productive effort
associated with the worker’s perception of fairness. If the wage exceeds the reference wage
(it is perceived as a gift) the worker gains some additional benefit of productive effort and
an increase in effort (a gift to the firm) will increase utility. If the wage falls short of the
reference wage (it is perceived as unfair) there is a psychological cost of productive effort
and a reduction in effort (an ‘unkind’ action towards the firm) increases utility. As such,
the morale function implies the worker’s payoff exhibits reciprocity, and since morale is
linked to loss aversion, negative reciprocity is stronger than positive reciprocity.
2.2 The worker’s choice of effort
Given a reference wage r and a wage offer w, the worker will seek to
max
e≥0
m(w)− d(e) + en(w|r).
The necessary (and under our assumptions sufficient) first-order condition is
−d′(e) + n(w|r) ≤ 0, (5)
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in which the inequality is replaced with an equality if e > 0. To save on notational
complexity, we henceforth assume an interior solution5 in which the optimal effort is given
by
e˜(w, r, λ) = d′−1(n(w|r)) =

d
′−1(η[m(w)−m(r)]) ≡ e˜(w, r)+ if w > r
d
′−1(0) ≡ e˜n if w = r
d
′−1(λη[m(w)−m(r)]) ≡ e˜(w, r, λ)− if w < r.
(6)
When w = r the morale function is zero and the worker’s utility is maximised by the
value of effort such that d′(e) = 0, referred to as ‘normal’ effort and denoted e˜n, which
is positive (due to the inclusion of a net cost of productive activity with the properties
imposed in Assumption W2) and independent of the wage. This is consistent with the
idea that workers perceive positive satisfaction from engaging with productive activity.6
If the worker is paid a wage above their reference wage, they will positively reciprocate
this gift with ‘supra-normal’ effort e˜(w, r)+ > e˜n; while if the wage is set below their
reference wage, they will negatively reciprocate this unfair wage by exerting ‘sub-normal’
effort e˜(w, r, λ)− < e˜n. The properties of the optimal effort function are summarised in the
following theorem.
Theorem 1. For a given r, e˜(w, r, λ) is a continuous function of w with e˜w(w, r, λ) > 0
and e˜ww(w, r, λ) < 0 for all w 6= r. Moreover,
7
lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− = λ lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r + ǫ, r)
+,
so the effort function has a kink at w = r if λ > 1. For a given w, optimal effort e˜(w, r, λ)
is a continuous function of r with e˜r(w, r, λ) < 0 for all w 6= r. Finally, whilst optimal
effort above the reference wage is independent of λ, for all w < r: e˜λ(w, r, λ) < 0 and
e˜wλ(w, r, λ) > 0.
5In the proof of Theorem 1 we give a sufficient condition for this to be the case.
6Inspired by the findings reported in Bewley (2007)—that it is not wage levels but changes in wages
that influence effort—normal effort should be a non-pecuniary concept and is therefore modelled as being
independent of the wage. See, for example, the discussion in Altmann et al. (2014, Appendix). A similar
assumption is also considered by Sliwka and Werner (2017), Kaur (2018) and Macera and te Velde (2018).
7Throughout the paper, where sequences of ǫ are considered over which limits are taken we specify that
{ǫn}
∞
n=1 ⊂ R+, meaning that where the wage is specified to be r − ǫ and we take the limit as ǫ → 0 we
consider the wage increasing to the reference wage, and likewise when the wage is specified to be r+ ǫ and
we take ǫ→ 0 we consider the wage decreasing to the reference wage.
8
This relationship between effort and the wage is illustrated in Figure 1.
w0 r
e˜n
e
e˜(w, r, λ)
λ = 1
λ > 1
Figure 1:
Asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity
The asymmetric nature of effort responses has the particular implication that for
changes in the wage from an initial wage equal to the reference wage, the effect of negative
reciprocity that results from a wage cut will be greater than the effect of positive reciprocity
resulting from a wage increase. The extent of this ‘asymmetric reference-dependent reci-
procity’ depends on the worker’s degree of loss aversion. Indeed, if a worker is not loss
averse (λ = 1), reciprocity is symmetric.
Our derived wage-effort relationship is consistent with the large body of evidence doc-
umenting the asymmetric nature of workers’ reciprocity in response to wage changes (see,
for instance, the anthropological evidence documented in Campbell and Kamlani (1997)
and Bewley (1999); the field experiments of Kube et al. (2013) and Cohn et al. (2014);
and the related literature surveyed in Bewley (2007), Fehr et al. (2009) and Malmendier
et al. (2014)). Moreover, our model formally identifies loss aversion as the psychological
foundation for why negative reciprocity is stronger, therefore providing a micro-foundation
for reduced-form effort/production functions exhibiting asymmetric reciprocity that are
commonly assumed in the literature (e.g. Elsby (2009), Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) and
Kaur (2018)) but that are not explicitly modelled.
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2.3 The firm’s wage setting rule
Next we consider the firm’s problem in setting the wage given that it anticipates the
behaviour of the worker. After observing the worker’s reference wage r and match produc-
tivity q, the firm will seek to maximise its profit given that the worker’s effort is determined
as in (6). As such, the firm’s problem is to
max
w≥0
y(q, e˜(w, r, λ))− s(w).
We showed in Theorem 1 that the worker’s optimal effort function e˜(w, r, λ) is contin-
uous in the wage, but that there is a kink at w = r for a loss averse worker. The fact that
the firm’s profit function is continuous and concave in w allows us to derive the optimal
wage setting rule, accounting for the kink in the profit function at w = r.8 For w 6= r the
optimal wage is characterised by the following first-order condition
ye(q, e˜(w, r, λ))e˜w(w, r, λ)− s
′(w) ≤ 0, (7)
where the inequality is replaced with an equality if w > 0. Again to save on notation,
we henceforth assume an interior solution.9 The first term in (7) captures the marginal
product of labour induced by a wage change, while the second term captures the related
per-worker marginal cost. The resulting optimal wage setting rule is characterised by two
productivity thresholds: a lower threshold ql, which is such that if q < ql then profit is
maximised where the marginal product of labour equals the marginal cost at a wage strictly
below the reference wage; and an upper threshold qu, which is such that if q > qu then
profit is maximised by equating the marginal product of labour with the marginal cost at
a wage exceeding the reference wage. Instead, if ql ≤ q ≤ qu profit will be maximised at
the kink, i.e. where w = r. If the match productivity falls below a reservation threshold
8For w 6= r concavity of profit requires yee[e˜w]
2 + yee˜ww < 0. This follows from our assumptions and
the conclusion of Theorem 1 that for w 6= r e˜ww < 0. To ensure concavity over the entire domain we need
to ensure that at w = r the marginal profit reduces, which follows again from the conclusions of Theorem
1 that imply limǫ→0 e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− ≥ limǫ→0 e˜w(r + ǫ, r, λ)
+, where the inequality is strict if λ > 1.
9This requires the marginal product of labour to be sufficiently high when effort is at its lowest, so that
ye(q, e˜(0, r, λ))e˜w(0, r, λ)− s
′(0) > 0.
q(r, λ), implicitly defined by the zero-profit condition:
π(w˜(r, q, λ); q, e˜(w˜(r, q, λ), r, λ)) = 0
the employment relationship will be terminated.
These properties are summarised in the following theorem.
Theorem 2. The optimal wage w˜(r, q, λ) is a continuous function of q and r and is given
by
w˜(r, q, λ) =

w˜(r, q)+ if q > qu(r)
r if ql(r, λ) ≤ q ≤ qu(r)
w˜(r, q, λ)− if q < ql(r, λ),
(8)
where ql(r, λ) and qu(r) are respectively characterised by the value of q such that
lim
ǫ→0
ye(q, e˜(r − ǫ, r, λ))e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)− s
′(r − ǫ) = 0; and
lim
ǫ→0
ye(q, e˜(r + ǫ, r, λ))e˜w(r + ǫ, r, λ)− s
′(r + ǫ) = 0;
(all singletons), so long as q ≥ q(r, λ).
The optimal wage w˜(r, q)+(−) (> (<) r) is implicitly defined by (7). Moreover:
a) w˜q(r, q, λ) > 0 for all q ∈ [q(r, λ),∞) \ [q
l(r, λ), qu(r)];
b) w˜r(r, q, λ) > 0 for all [q(r, λ),∞); and
c) w˜λ(r, q, λ) > 0 for all [q(r, λ), q
l(r, λ)).
In addition, ql(r, λ) < qu(r) for all λ > 1 and if λ = 1, ql(r, 1) = qu(r), and
d) qlλ(r, λ) < 0, q
l
r(r, λ) > 0; and
e) qu′(r) > 0.
The reservation productivity has the properties that q
r
(r, λ) > 0 and q
λ
(r, λ) ≥ 0, where
the final inequality is strict if q(r, λ) < ql(r, λ).
The main features of the firm’s optimal wage when facing a loss averse worker are
illustrated in Figure 2.
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qw
ql(r, λ) qu(r)
r
w˜(r, q, λ)
w˜(r, q)+
w˜(r, q, λ)−
Figure 2:
The wage setting rule
The optimal wage is non-decreasing in the match productivity and there is a range of
match productivity within which the wage is not adjusted. We refer to this as the ‘range
of rigidity’, which is non-empty if the worker is loss averse as in this region the benefit of
reducing the wage will be offset by the cost generated by the worker’s negative reciprocity
response. Note that a firm employing a worker with a greater degree of loss aversion will
be less willing to suffer the relatively high cost of negative reciprocity for a given match
productivity (i.e. the range of rigidity becomes larger as qlλ(r, λ) < 0), and if q is low enough
that the firm wishes to pay w˜(r, q, λ)− (< r), it will have an incentive to attenuate some of
the effect from the stronger negative reciprocity, by paying a higher wage: w˜λ(r, q, λ)
− > 0.
Negative reciprocity not only tempers the firm’s incentive to cut the wage, it also reduces
the extent to which the wage is cut.10 Finally, the more loss averse a worker is, the higher
is the reservation productivity that the firm requires from the employment relationship for
it to be profitable: q
λ
(r, λ) > 0, since a higher λ reduces per-worker output and increases
the per-worker labour cost.
10This implication has been theoretically derived, and empirically corroborated, in a model of firm-level
wage bargaining by Holden and Wulfsberg (2014), who show that “even if the wage is cut, the resulting
wage will be higher than if the wage-setting process had been completely flexible”. In contrast with their
theoretical model, our theory attributes this result to the worker’s extent of negative reciprocity.
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3 Adaptation, Loss Aversion and the Employment
Contract
We now turn to explore the dynamic implications of asymmetric reciprocity and reference
dependence for optimal wage setting and hiring in a two-period dynamic environment. In
so doing we introduce uncertainty around the evolution of the match productivity and,
inspired by the literature that suggests reference points are influenced by previous contrac-
tual arrangements, we model the reference wage as being endogenously determined by the
past wage (see Section 4 for a discussion of this literature). To capture these features, we
impose the following two assumptions:
D1. The match productivity qt follows a Markov process described by the cumulative
distribution function F (q1|q0), q0 given.
D2. The worker’s reference wage evolves according to the adaptation rule: r1 = w0, r0
given.
The timing of the model is as follows. At the beginning of the first employment period,
the match productivity q0 and the exogenously-given reference wage r0 are observed. The
firm then decides whether to offer a wage contract to the worker and start the employment
relationship. We assume that any offer is accepted by the worker.11 If an employment
relationship is established, then at the beginning of the second employment period the
match productivity changes stochastically to a new value q1, and the worker adapts their
reference wage to the wage paid in the initial period of employment. After observing q1, and
inferring the worker’s new reference wage, the firm considers whether it wants to continue
the employment relationship and, if so, whether to adjust the wage in light of the change
in match productivity.
The forward-looking firm therefore faces a two-period dynamic optimisation problem
11For clarity of exposition, we choose not to explicitly model reservation wages; in the Appendix we
show that it is straightforward to impose a condition on the exogenous variables of the model such that
the worker’s participation constraint is never binding which justifies this approach. That said, reservation
wages might be relevant in a richer macroeconomic framework in which the worker’s initial reference wage
is endogenous, and, in particular, dependent on the state of the labour market.
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q0 is drawn
r0 is given
w˜0
0
wage contract
q1 is realised
r1 = w˜0
wage renegotiation
w˜1
1
initial
employment period
subsequent
employment period
Figure 3:
Two-period employment relationship time-line.
under uncertainty. Letting δ represent the firm’s discount factor, this is characterised by
max
{w(rt,qt,λ)}1t=0
E0
[
1∑
t=0
δtπ(wt; qt, et)
]
s.t. et = e˜(wt, rt, λ),
r1 = w0,
r0, q0 given.
(9)
So that we can transparently capture the effect of adaptation of reference wages, our
model abstracts from any dynamic implications of the worker’s choice of effort, such as
effort directly influencing the subsequent wage offer. Absent this link the worker can be
seen as choosing effort to maximise their per-period utility, in accordance with the optimal
effort function (6) derived in Section 2.
The analysis that follows is divided in two parts: first we illustrate the wage and
effort dynamics by considering a myopic firm (δ = 0), and highlight that downward wage
rigidity may occur as a result of the worker’s reference wage adaptation combined with loss
aversion. Then we consider a forward-looking firm (δ > 0) and characterise the optimal
employment contract that solves the problem in (9) to explore its properties in light of the
novel behavioural elements introduced by our model.
3.1 Wage and effort dynamics: an illustration
In this section we illustrate some dynamic properties of the model by considering a simple
parameterised example with a myopic firm (δ = 0). We focus the analysis around two
interdependent features of wage and effort dynamics: i) downward wage rigidity; and ii)
the temporary nature of worker’s reciprocity.
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Consistent with Assumptions F1-F2 and W1-W3 of Section 2, consider the follow-
ing functional forms: per-worker output y(q, e) = qe; per-worker labour cost s(w) = w;
worker’s utility from the wage m(w) = logw; and their net cost of productive activity
d(e) = e2/2 − be, with b > 0. Denoting e˜(wt, rt, λ) = e˜t and w˜(rt, qt, λ) = w˜t, in each
period t = {0, 1} the worker’s optimal effort function and the firm’s optimal wage take the
following simple forms:
e˜t =

e˜n + η[logwt − log rt] if wt > rt
e˜n if wt = rt
e˜n − λη[log rt − logwt] if wt < rt;
w˜t =

ηqt if qt > q
u(rt)
rt if q
l(rt, λ) ≤ qt ≤ q
u(rt)
ληqt if qt < q
l(rt, λ);
where e˜n = b;
ql(rt, λ) =
rt
λη
and qu(rt) =
rt
η
;
and we assume that in both the initial and subsequent employment periods the match is
profitable.
Consider a worker characterised by a relatively high match productivity q0 > q
u(r0)
such that the firm will find it profitable to hire them and pay a wage gift w˜0 = ηq0 (> r0),
which is positively reciprocated by supra-normal effort e˜0 > e˜
n in the first employment
period. This is illustrated in Figure 4a below. As the employment relationship passes into
the second employment period, the worker adjusts their feelings of entitlement, adapting
their reference wage to their initial wage: r1 = w˜0 = ηq0. This ‘shifts’ the wage-setting
rule, as illustrated in Figure 4b: the reference wage increases, the lower threshold increases
to ql(r1) = r1/[λη] = q0/λ, and the upper threshold increases to q
u(r1) = r1/η = q0.
If in the subsequent employment period the match productivity remains unchanged, so
that q1 = q
u(r1), optimal wage setting implies w˜1 = r1 (= w˜0). However notice that whilst
the initial wage w˜0 was positively reciprocated by the worker in period 0, after reference
wage adaptation the worker has an updated sense of entitlement and now perceives this
wage as fair, meaning that effort is merely normal e˜1 = e˜
n. Hence, due to reference
wage adaptation reciprocity is a temporary phenomenon. This implication of the model is
consistent with the evidence reported by field surveys that the positive effects of a wage gift
on morale and effort are believed to be only temporary by firms’ managers (e.g. Campbell
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(a) Initial Contract t = 0
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(b) Renegotiation t = 1
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w˜1
q1
w˜1
Figure 4:
Reference wage adaptation and downward wage rigidity.
and Kamlani (1997), Bewley (1999)). It also supports the interpretation according to
which—in field experiments—positive reciprocity quickly disappears as workers get used
to the wage they receive (see, for instance, Gneezy and List (2006), Mas (2006) and Cohn
et al. (2014)). Evidence of such effort dynamics has also recently been documented in the
laboratory experiment of Sliwka and Werner (2017), which also corroborates the hypothesis
of reference wage adaptation.12 We define this adjustment of effort over time as dynamic
‘re-normalisation’ of effort.
If the match productivity increases q1 > q0, the firm will instead find it optimal to
increase the wage w˜1 = ηq1 > r1 (= w˜0), to benefit from the gift being reciprocated by
supra-normal effort. On the other hand, if the match productivity decreases q1 < q0,
whether the wage is adjusted downward depends on how large the negative shock is. As
illustrated in Figure 4b, only if q1 < q0/λ will the firm implement a wage cut w˜1 = ληq1 < r1
(= w˜0). As such, a fall in match productivity over time is not necessarily followed by a
wage cut: the worker’s reference wage adaptation implies that, if the match productivity
only moderately decreases q0/λ ≤ q1 < q0, the firm will optimally freeze the wage. The
negative effect of what would now be perceived as an unfair wage cut, borne through
negative reciprocity, will be larger than the benefit of paying a lower wage, hence the firm
12Sliwka and Werner (2017) conduct a laboratory experiment in which individuals work on a real-effort
task and are paid different wage profiles which vary in the frequency and size of wage increases. They
find that the positive effect on effort of a wage increase only lasts one period and that in the following
periods, absent subsequent increases in the wage, working performance converges back towards the level
associated with a constant wage. Interestingly, the field experiment by Kube et al. (2013) also indicates
that negative reciprocity is more persistent than positive reciprocity. In light of our theory this evidence
suggests that reference wage adaptation, which drives the temporary nature of reciprocity, may also be
asymmetric: workers adapt more rapidly to wage increases than to wage cuts (see Fongoni (2018a) for a
preliminary exploration of this hypothesis).
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will avoid inciting such negative reciprocity by keeping the wage equal to the worker’s
reference wage w˜1 = r1 (= w˜0). To draw a more direct link with the empirical literature on
downward wage rigidity (e.g. Dickens et al. (2007)), Figure 5 illustrates the distribution
of log-wage changes, implied by our model, to a log-normally distributed shock around q0
in period 1, comparing the case of symmetric (λ = 1) vs. asymmetric reference-dependent
reciprocity (λ > 1).13
(a) λ = 1 (b) λ > 1
Figure 5:
Theoretical distributions of log-wage changes
Note: Simulated distributions of log-wage changes from the model based on the following assumptions
and parameter values: the initial productivity and reference wage are q0 = 10 and r0 = 1; η = 1 and the
loss aversion parameter is λ = 1 in Figure 5a and λ = 1.8 in Figure 5b (the experimental literature on
loss aversion estimates λ ∈ [1.43, 4.8]; see Abdellaoui et al. (2007) for a review); q1 = q0 + ε, where the
shock ε is log-normally distributed around 0 with variance 10, so that log q1 ∼ N (q0, 10); and normal
effort is set as e˜n ≡ b = 10 to ensure the employment relationship remains profitable even for large
negative shocks. The number of simulations is 10,000.
Notice that the downward wage rigidity implied by our model is not a static result.
By virtue of the worker’s (one-period) adaptation to wage increases during periods of
positive productivity growth, the firm will face the marginal trade-off between a wage cut
and negative reciprocity at any subsequent employment period characterised by a fall in
productivity. Downward wage rigidity may arise even at wage levels substantially higher
than those with which the employment relationship had initially started. As such our
theory formally demonstrates that downward wage rigidity is an inherent feature of the
13This simple simulation is inspired by the analogous exercise performed by Benjamin (2015). However
note that contrary to his, but in line with empirically observed distributions of wage changes, our model
does not generate a gap in the distribution of wage changes below zero.
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employment contract in a dynamic environment, the key features that drive which are the
worker’s dynamic adaptation of the reference wage (rt = w˜t−1), and the relatively large
cost to the firm of negative reciprocity that derives from loss aversion (λ > 1). In fact, the
combination of these two features—more generally, an asymmetric adjustment cost around
the past wage—is also necessary in other models of dynamic downward wage rigidity, such
as, Elsby (2009), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009), Benjamin (2015) and Kaur (2018).
3.2 The optimal employment contract
We now turn back to the general model and analyse the properties of a forward-looking
firm’s wage setting and hiring decision in light of the behavioural mechanisms just dis-
cussed, which, whilst considered in the context of a parameterised model for illustration,
apply equally to the general model.
We denote by Jt(rt, qt) the firm’s value function of the employment relationship in
period t = {0, 1}. The functional equation corresponding to the firm’s sequence problem
in (9) can therefore be written as:
J0(r0, q0) = max
w0
{π(w0; q0, e˜(w0, r0, λ)) + δE0[J1(w0, q1)|q0]} ,
where J1(r1, q1) = max
w1
π(w1; q1, e˜(w1, r1, λ)).
(10)
Due to reference wage adaptation r1 = w0, the expected continuation value of the em-
ployment relationship E0[J1(w0, q1)|q0] now also depends on the initial wage. Recognising
that the lay-off reservation productivity in period 1 may fall anywhere in the support of
the distribution of match productivity, to ease notational burden we make the assumption
that the parameters of the model are such that q(w0, λ) < q
l(w0, λ). Hence, the expected
continuation value of the employment relationship can be expressed as
E0[J1(w0, q1)|q0] =
∫ ql(w0,λ)
q(w0,λ)
J1(w0, q1)
− dF (q1|q0)
+
∫ qu(w0)
ql(w0,λ)
J1(w0, q1)
= dF (q1|q0) +
∫ ∞
qu(w0)
J1(w0, q1)
+ dF (q1|q0), (11)
where J1(w0, q1)
−;=;+ represents the continuation value of the employment relationship
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when w1 < w0;w1 = w0;w1 > w0, in which effort is given by e˜(w1, w0, λ)
−; e˜n; e˜(w1, w0)
+.
This expression highlights that the firm faces different realisations of future profit when
setting the initial wage w0, depending on whether the subsequent match productivity q1
is below, within or above the range of rigidity [ql(w0, λ), q
u(w0)]. Attentive observation
of equation (11) allows us to infer two important insights: when setting the wage in the
initial employment period the firm influences both the expected continuation value of the
employment relationship in each of the three scenarios and the range of match productivity
over which these scenarios occur.
Define the marginal effect of a wage increase in period 0 on the expected future profit
in period 1 as
Φ(w0, λ) ≡
∂
∂r1
∫ ∞
q(w0,λ)
J1(w0, q1) dF (q1|q0).
We demonstrate in the following proposition that higher initial wages are always detrimen-
tal to expected future profit.
Proposition 1. For all λ ≥ 1, a higher initial wage reduces the expected continuation
value of the employment relationship:
Φ(w0, λ) =
∫ ql(w0,λ)
q(w0,λ)
yee˜r(w˜1, w0, λ)
− dF −
∫ qu(w0)
ql(w0,λ)
s′(w0) dF +
∫ ∞
qu(w0)
yee˜r(w˜1, w0)
+ dF < 0.
When setting the initial wage in a dynamic environment a forward-looking firm will
therefore account for an additional expected future cost : a higher initial wage increases
the worker’s reference wage in the subsequent renegotiation, which negatively influences
effort and the value of the employment relationship to the firm.14 A marginal increase in
the initial wage lowers this expected value because if the firm subsequently wants to cut
the wage then the effect of negative reciprocity is greater; if it wishes to freeze the wage
then the wage paid is simply higher; and if it wants to increase the wage then the effect of
positive reciprocity is lower.
14While this prediction may seem obvious in the context of our model, notice that in models in which
the worker’s effort also depends on the absolute wage level (e.g. in the spirit of Akerlof (1982)), a higher
initial wage will also generate an additional expected benefit in terms of higher effort in the future, in
contrast to the result established in Proposition 1.
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Next, define the marginal effect of a wage increase on the current profit in period 0 as
Ψ(w0; q0, r0, λ) ≡ ye(q, e˜(w0, r0, λ))e˜w(w0, r0, λ)− s
′(w0).
So long as w0 6= r0 the necessary first-order condition that characterises the solution to the
firm’s problem in (10) is
Ψ(w0; q0, r0, λ)− δ|Φ(w0, λ)| = 0. (12)
The optimal hiring wage will be set to balance the inter-temporal tradeoff between the net
marginal value in the initial period of a higher wage with the expected discounted marginal
cost that stems from adaptation to this wage in the subsequent period.
As we note in the proof of the following theorem, for this condition to be also sufficient
to characterise a maximum, it is required that the firm’s value function J0(r0, q0) is concave
in w0. This is not straightforward to prove since the sign of the derivative of Φ(w0, λ) with
respect to w0 remains undetermined: Φw0 ≶ 0 (see Appendix for details).15 Nevertheless,
note that the concavity of the instantaneous profit function established in Theorem 2
implies that J0(r0, q0) will also be concave if the firm is sufficiently impatient.
To proceed with the analysis we make the following assumption:
D3. The firm’s discount factor δ is such that
Ψw(w0; q0, r0, λ)− δ|Φw0(w0, λ)| < 0.
This assumption essentially implies that the firm will always put a larger weight on the
‘current direct effect’ of a change in the wage on marginal profit (captured by Ψw) than on
the ‘expected discounted future indirect effect’ that results from the initial wage becoming
the reference wage (captured by δΦw0).
Let qˆ(r0, λ, δ) be the firm’s reservation productivity that governs hiring, implicitly de-
15This technicality was also an issue for the characterisation of the optimal wage policy in the model of
Elsby (2009), who considered an infinite-horizon environment. However, note that while Elsby (2009) had
to resort to numerical simulations to prove concavity, since we are interested in the analytical characteri-
sation of the optimal employment contract we will impose a simplifying assumption on the firm’s discount
factor instead.
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fined by J0(r0, q0) = 0. In a similar vein to our approach when considering a single employ-
ment period (i.e. Section 2), we can derive the optimal hiring wage of a forward-looking
firm, the properties of which are presented in the following theorem.
Theorem 3. The optimal hiring wage is given by
w˜0 = wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ) =

wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
+ if q0 > qˆ
u(r0, λ, δ)
r0 if qˆ
l(r0, λ, δ) ≤ q0 ≤ qˆ
u(r0, λ, δ)
wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
− if q0 < qˆ
l(r0, λ, δ),
where qˆl(r0, λ, δ) and qˆ
u(r0, λ, δ) are respectively characterised by the value of q0 such that
lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r0 − ǫ; q0, r0, λ)− δ|Φ(r0 − ǫ, λ)| = 0; and
lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r0 + ǫ; q0, r0, λ)− δ|Φ(r0 + ǫ, λ)| = 0;
(all singletons), so long as q0 ≥ qˆ(r0, λ, δ).
The optimal wage wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ)
+(−) is implicitly defined by (12). Moreover:
a) wˆq(r0, q0, λ, δ) > 0 for all q0 ∈ [qˆ(r0, λ, δ),∞) \ [qˆ
l(r0, λ, δ), qˆ
u(r0, λ, δ)]; and
b) wr(r0, q0, λ, δ) > 0 for all q0 ∈ [qˆ(r0, λ, δ),∞).
Model implications: downward wage rigidity and wage compression
Since a forward-looking firm perceives an additional marginal cost of raising the current
wage (as we established in Proposition 1), it will have an incentive to hire the worker
at a lower wage, relative to that of a myopic firm in an otherwise identical employment
relationship. This insight, which we will refer to as ‘wage compression’, was first analysed
by Elsby (2009), who attributes the incentive to compress the wage entirely to a firm’s
anticipation of future downward wage rigidities.16 Our model identifies that it is the
worker’s adaptation and re-normalisation of effort—and not downward wage rigidity per
se—that is the main driver of wage compression. This is formally established by the
following proposition.
16Also note that a similar wage compression effect is present in the DSGE model of Benigno and Ricci
(2011) in which, however, downward wage rigidity is imposed as a purely exogenous constraint on the
household optimisation problem (see the discussion at p.1444–1446).
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Proposition 2. For any λ ≥ 1, a forward-looking firm will set a lower initial wage than
a myopic firm:
wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ) ≤ w˜(r0, q0, λ),
with a strict inequality whenever w0 6= r0.
The optimal wage (when not equal to the reference wage), is determined by the op-
timality condition in (12). While a myopic firm only considers the current net marginal
value of a higher initial wage, a forward-looking firm also considers the expected discounted
marginal cost of an increase in the hiring wage, which is positive for all workers, both those
that are loss averse and those that are not, since
|Φ(w0, 1)| =
∣∣∣∣∣
∫ ∞
q(w0,1)
yee˜r(w˜1, w0, 1) dF
∣∣∣∣∣ > 0.
This is due to reference wage adaptation and the dynamic re-normalisation of effort: a
higher initial wage that is positively reciprocated in the first employment period would
translate into a higher reference wage in the subsequent period, which in turn would reduce,
in expectation, the worker’s extent of reciprocity in the future—reciprocity in our model
is a temporary phenomenon. As such, even in the absence of downward wage rigidity, a
forward-looking firm has an incentive to compress the hiring wage.
Nevertheless, does the expectation of downward wage rigidity with a worker for whom
λ > 1 reinforce or temper a firm’s wage compression incentive? The answer to this question
is particularly important in understanding whether the expectation of downward wage
rigidity (for instance, of workers hired during recessionary episodes) would also imply a
more compressed wage growth throughout the employment relationship. To provide an
answer we need to analyse the effect of loss aversion λ on the optimal hiring wage wˆ0.
17
Whenever w˜t < rt for all t = {0, 1}, a firm employing a more loss averse worker has a
stronger incentive to reduce the gap between the unfair wage paid and the reference wage,
to attenuate the stronger effect of negative reciprocity (as we established in Section 2).
In the initial employment period where the reference wage is exogenous, this puts upward
17Our analysis concerns the hiring wage since we consider a simple two-period environment. If we were
to extend the time horizon, the results derived hereafter would in fact apply to any subsequent wage
payment preceding the last employment period.
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pressure on the hiring wage. We call this the current direct effect of loss aversion, denoted
by Ψλ > 0. However, due to reference wage adaptation in the subsequent employment
period: on one hand A) a greater extent of loss aversion puts downward pressure on the
hiring wage, since by setting a lower wage—that will translate into a lower reference wage—
the firm can reduce the magnitude of the expected negative reciprocity; but on the other
hand B) since the firm will also be less willing to retain a worker who exhibits a stronger
incidence of negative reciprocity (i.e., a more loss averse worker), the probability of the
firm having to enact a wage cut is also lower, partially offsetting the greater expected cost
of doing so.18 We define these as the expected indirect effects of loss aversion, given by19
Φλ =
∫ ql
q
[yeee˜λe˜r + yee˜rλ]︸ ︷︷ ︸
A<0
dF − q
λ
yee˜rf(q|q0)︸ ︷︷ ︸
B>0
⋚ 0. (13)
The relative importance of these effects determines the overall incidence of loss aversion
on the optimal wage contract.
Proposition 3. The effect of λ on the hiring wage depends on the following conditions:
a) if Φλ < 0 and q0 ≥ qˆ
l(r0, λ, δ), then wˆλ(r0, q0, λ, δ) < 0;
b) if Φλ < 0 and q0 < qˆ
l(r0, λ, δ), then wˆλ(r0, q0, λ, δ) < 0⇔ Ψλ < δ|Φλ| ;
c) if Φλ ≥ 0, then wˆλ(r0, q0, λ, δ) ≥ 0.
Proposition 3 establishes that the effect of λ on the optimal hiring wage wˆ0 is ambiguous,
which is a very natural conclusion given the effects at play in our model. Suppose, for the
initial part of this discussion, that the probability of being in a situation to enact costly
wage cuts in the future is sufficiently high so that Φλ < 0 (i.e. the lay-off reservation
productivity q(w0, λ) does not increase too much with λ, which implies that effect (B)
18This latter effect was established in Theorem 2. As such, our model predicts that in the presence of
loss averse workers, there will be both downward wage rigidity and layoffs in periods in which productivity
declines. Note, however, that if we were to simulate the model the full extent of downward wage rigidity
may not be observed in the distribution of wage changes following a large negative shock even if it is
a salient feature of the employment contract: firms that are critically constrained by downward wage
rigidity will lay off the least productive workers. This is consistent with the recent work by Kurmann
and McEntarfer (2017) who find that in the U.S. during the Great Recession wage freezes have been less
popular, which they attribute not to a lack of downward wage rigidity but to the least productive workers
being laid off, and to the most productive workers receiving wage cuts.
19For a detailed derivation of this expression, see the Proof of Proposition 3 in the Appendix.
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identified above is sufficiently small). Now consider a worker that is hired at a relatively
high match productivity q0 ≥ qˆ
l(r0, λ, δ), i.e. case a) (hence wˆ0 ≥ r0 so Ψλ = 0, i.e., there is
no current direct effect of loss aversion). This scenario was also the one analysed in Section
3.1. In this particular case the expectation of stronger negative reciprocity and downward
wage rigidity would unambiguously lead to wage compression, since the firm optimally
sets a lower wage to keep the worker’s wage entitlement low and reduce the extent of the
expected negative reciprocity if w˜1 < w˜0 in the subsequent employment period.
Next consider a worker that is hired at a relatively low match productivity q0 <
qˆl(r0, λ, δ), i.e., case b) (hence wˆ0 < r0 and Ψλ > 0). In this case, a higher λ would
lead to wage compression only if the firm’s incentive to set a higher wage to attenuate
negative reciprocity in period 0 is dominated by the incentive to set a lower wage to keep
the worker’s reference wage low, and to reduce their negative reciprocity response in the
event of a future (unfair) wage cut in period 1. However, notice that these conclusions are
subject to presuming that Φλ < 0. If, as in case c), Φλ ≥ 0, there is an additional marginal
consideration that partially offsets the wage compression incentive: a greater probability
of layoff following a large negative shock implies that the probability of the firm having
to incur the cost of negative reciprocity in period 1 is also lower. As such we conclude
that the expectation of downward wage rigidity does not necessarily lead to wage com-
pression.20 Our model highlights that the incentive for wage compression is driven by a
worker’s reference wage adaptation and dynamic re-normalisation of effort; and that wage
rigidity may either strengthen or dampen this incentive.
20Someone may argue that in a long-term employment relationship the initial effect of negative reci-
procity will not be so important (i.e. Ψλ < δ|Φλ| as t → ∞) so that firms will always compress hiring
wages. However, this statement is not necessarily true for two reasons. First, the expected future indirect
effects of loss aversion are discounted, so it is still possible that the current direct effect dominates (i.e.
Ψλ > δ|Φλ| for sufficiently impatient firms). Second, in our model the expectation of downward wage
rigidity also reduces the expected duration of the employment relationship (by increasing the firm’s fu-
ture lay-off reservation productivity), since firms would optimally layoff workers rather than implementing
costly wage cuts. This latter effect (i.e. effect (B) of equation (13)) reduces the range of negative shocks
over which a firm would experience negative reciprocity due to a wage cut, and therefore reduces the related
costs of doing so. Finally notice that the models of Elsby (2009) and Benigno and Ricci (2011), which
consider an infinite horizon, do not feature a lay-off reservation productivity that is endogenous to optimal
wage setting and reciprocity, as we do in our model. That is why downward wage rigidity unambiguously
implies wage compression in their models.
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Model implications: loss aversion and hiring
We conclude our investigation of asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity and wage
rigidity on the nature of the employment contract by considering their effects on a firm’s
hiring decision. This can be done by considering the effect of loss aversion λ on the firm’s
hiring reservation productivity qˆ(r0, λ, δ). There are two channels through which loss
aversion could influence the value of the employment relationship to the firm. First, there
is the direct negative effect on effort, which exacerbates a worker’s negative reciprocity
response in each t = {0, 1}. Second, there is the indirect effect that comes from our
analysis related to Proposition 3: if the hiring wage is increasing in λ this provides a
compounding negative effect on expected effort and a higher labour cost, which lowers
profit; whilst if the initial wage is decreasing in λ—i.e. wage compression—there is a
partially offsetting positive effect on expected effort and a lower labour cost, which increases
profit. Nevertheless, we can show that if a firm is considering contracting with a more loss
averse worker the reservation productivity determining hiring unambiguously increases,
independently of how the hiring wage adjusts.
Proposition 4. The firm’s reservation productivity for hiring is increasing in λ:
qˆ
λ
(r0, λ, δ) > 0.
The mechanism behind the neutrality of this result to changes in the hiring wage lies
in the firm’s optimal wage setting: since the initial wage is set to balance the expected
direct/indirect effects of loss aversion on output (effort) and labour cost (wage) at the
margins to satisfy the first-order condition in (12), a higher degree of loss aversion nega-
tively affects profit only through the stronger negative reciprocity response of the worker
whenever w˜t < rt. We can therefore conclude that, independently of whether wage rigidity
reinforces or tempers the incentive to compress hiring wages, the anticipation of stronger
negative reciprocity and the expectation of downward wage rigidity unambiguously reduces
a firm’s incentive to hire.
This prediction is consistent with the empirical evidence reported in Kurmann and
McEntarfer (2017), who find that firms that are more constrained by downward wage
25
rigidity employ on average higher productivity employees. Moreover, this result has im-
plications for understanding the effects of wage rigidity on job creation. In the literature
concerned with labour market fluctuations, much attention has been devoted to the effect of
wage rigidity in the wages paid to newly hired workers on firms’ job creation incentives (see
for instance Pissarides (2009), the discussion in Elsby et al. (2015) and references therein).
In contrast, Proposition 4 establishes that it is the anticipated negative reciprocity and the
expected wage rigidity of incumbents that reduces a firm’s incentive to hire, independently
of the rigidity/flexibility of the hiring wage. As such, our analysis suggests that incorpo-
rating our model into a richer macroeconomic framework could potentially enhance the
understanding of the effects of anticipated wage rigidities of existing/incumbent workers
on job creation and unemployment.
4 Related Literature
The theory we develop in this paper reconciles within a single analytical framework sev-
eral ideas and concepts that have been extensively discussed in relation to wage setting
behaviour and the employment contract. As such, our paper is inevitably related with a
large body of literature—spanning from the study of reciprocity in labour relations to wage
dynamics.
4.1 Theories of reciprocity
Our model of asymmetric reference-dependent reciprocity is related to earlier theories of
fairness and reciprocity that were developed to explain the growing body of experimental
evidence against the self-interest hypothesis in economics. This literature can be divided
between: i) pure outcome-based (or distributional preferences) reciprocity models, accord-
ing to which individuals are only concerned about the distributional consequences of their
actions (Fehr and Schmidt, 1999; Bolton and Ockenfels, 2000); ii) intentions-based reci-
procity models, according to which it is a player’s intention behind a certain action that
matters for fairness judgements (Rabin, 1993; Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger, 2004); and iii)
a combination of both outcome- and intentions-based reciprocity (i.e. Falk and Fischbacher
(2006)).
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We consider a simple setting of reciprocity in which only one party to the transaction—
the worker—has preferences for fairness captured in our morale function, and what they
perceive as fair is given (by the reference outcome), rather than being constructed from
what could otherwise have been chosen by the firm. Since the firm is assumed to know
the worker’s perception of what is a fair wage, deviations from this are considered as
being intended. The ‘kindness’ of the firm is captured by the wage paid in relation to the
reference wage; whilst the ‘kindness’ of the worker is captured by their effort in relation
to normal effort. The firm (who moves first) is assumed to be purely self-interested, but
they nevertheless care about fairness because of the effect of the worker’s response to the
wage paid on profit. Despite its simplicity, our model captures the essence of positive and
negative reciprocity, and implies behaviour consistent with that documented in real labour
markets.
4.2 Reciprocity in labour markets
Our paper is also related to the more recent theoretical literature that applies the concept of
reciprocity to enhance our understanding of the employment relationship (microeconomic
approaches) and labour market dynamics (macroeconomic approaches).
Microeconomic approaches. Benjamin (2015) extends the inequity-aversion model of
Fehr and Schmidt (1999) to study a gift-exchange game between a self-interested profit-
maximising firm and a ‘fair-minded’ worker, who chooses effort to equate their own ‘surplus
payoff’ with that of the firm: whenever the firm’s profit increases (decreases) relative to
a reference payoff, the worker will optimally decrease (increase) effort to re-balance the
difference in payoffs. Particularly related to our derivation of asymmetric reciprocity and
effort dynamics is the work of Sliwka and Werner (2017). In the spirit of Cox et al. (2007)
they develop a dynamic model of reciprocity in which—depending on their ‘emotional
state’—the worker also cares about the firm’s payoff. The reference wage, which affects
the emotional state attached to a wage offer, follows a dynamic adaptation rule (equivalent
to our Assumption D2). They test their model in the laboratory and find that the effect of
wage gifts on effort is only temporary, as our model would also predict. However, Sliwka
27
and Werner (2017) do not analyse optimal wage setting and hiring behaviour.21 In a
more recent paper Macera and te Velde (2018) develop a model of reference-dependent
reciprocity and analyse the consequences of surprising versus anticipated wage gifts. They
find that fully surprising gifts (when the reference wage is fixed) lead to higher effort than
fully anticipated gifts (when the reference wage is determined by rational expectations a`
la Ko˝szegi and Rabin (2006)). Our application of reciprocity is fundamentally different
from the ones just described which, essentially, are all based on the worker’s consideration
of the firm’s payoff. Despite this leading to a set of predictions that are different from
our model (and also hard to reconcile with existing evidence),22 we believe our model to
be more plausible, since—as also argued by Dufwenberg and Kirchsteiger (2000, p.1071)—
informational problems characterising actual labour relations can make it hard for workers
to compare their payoff with that of their employer.23 Finally notice that while these models
rely on specific functional forms (and in the case of Benjamin (2015), also on numerical
parameter values), our model of worker’s reciprocity is simpler, more general, and derives
predictions with respect to optimal effort—namely, the asymmetric and temporary nature
of reciprocity—by imposing relatively modest assumptions on the worker’s preferences.
Macroeconomic approaches. In a series of papers, Danthine and Kurmann (2006, 2007,
2010) assume that workers’ preferences exhibit reciprocity a` la Rabin (1993) and anal-
yse the macroeconomic implications for wage and unemployment dynamics. A distinctive
feature of their framework is that the reference wage is also influenced by the firm’s abil-
ity to pay (the ‘internal reference’). In equilibrium, the firm’s gift is always positive and
workers exert supra-normal effort. However, Danthine and Kurmann do not capture neg-
ative reciprocity in the form of sub-normal effort, and their model generates wage rigidity
only under certain assumptions about the nature of shocks, workers’ reference wages and
21Despite being based on different assumptions regarding the worker’s preferences and reciprocity mo-
tives, our model and the one of Sliwka and Werner (2017) yield a similar theoretical prediction concerning
the temporary nature of positive reciprocity subject to reference wage adaptation. In this respect we would
like to acknowledge that the first version of our paper appeared in July 2015 (as a SIRE Discussion Paper
SIRE-DP-2015-57). Therefore, we believe our framework and the one of Sliwka and Werner (2017) were
likely to have been developed independently.
22For instance: in Benjamin (2015) effort increases when the firm freezes the wage, and when the negative
shock is so large that the firm optimally cuts the wage (see p. 201-202); in Sliwka and Werner (2017) the
assumption on the worker’s preferences would also imply that an exogenous increase in the firm’s payoff
will induce the worker to unconditionally exert higher effort; and in Macera and te Velde (2018) reciprocity
is asymmetric only for small changes of the wage relative to the reference wage. These predictions seem
hard to reconcile with existing evidence on reciprocity in labour markets.
23See also the discussion in Kube et al. (2013, p. 12).
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the functional form of the workers’ gift. In a more recent contribution Eliaz and Spiegler
(2014) qualitatively analyse the role of reference dependence, contractual incompleteness
and negative reciprocity—subsumed under a reduced-form reference-dependent production
function—for the volatility of unemployment. They capture an extreme form of negative
reciprocity: a wage cut below the reference wage, no matter how small, will induce a worker
to exert zero discretionary effort, leaving the adverse effect on output to be randomly de-
termined by a parameter that represents the incompleteness of the labour contract.24 In
contrast, our model identifies the severity of the adverse effect of a wage cut on output
by a combination of a worker’s degree of loss aversion (which determines the strength of
negative reciprocity) and the size of the wage cut.
4.3 Loss aversion and wage setting in labour markets
A key implication of our model is that wage cuts relative to the reference wage have a
stronger, negative impact on workers’ morale and effort than equivalent-sized wage gifts,
which stems from loss aversion in the worker’s evaluation of the wage relative to a reference
wage.
Loss aversion in the context of the labour market was first analysed by Bhaskar (1990),
who considered its implications for the determination of equilibrium unemployment in
a static monopoly-union model in which workers care about relative wage comparisons.
In a similar vein McDonald and Sibly (2001) incorporate loss aversion into an insider-
outsider model and focus on the implications for monetary policy. They show that under
the assumption of loss aversion, reference wage adaptation, and staggered wage contracts,
unanticipated monetary shocks can have permanent real effects on output and unemploy-
ment. More recently Ahrens et al. (2015) analyse the quantitative implications of reference
dependence and loss aversion in a monopsony model of the labour market in which workers
decide on how much employment (hours) to supply. According to their numerical simula-
24As they show in an appendix, Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) can derive their reduced-form production
function from a simple model that yields an expression for discretionary effort: if a worker is paid a wage
at least equal to their reference wage, the worker is assumed to exert effort normalised to unity (see p. 195);
if they are paid an unfair wage below their reference wage, effort is zero. Since the relative importance of
discretionary effort in a firm’s output is given by the extent to which the labour contract is incomplete,
this also determines the random fraction of output that is destroyed when a worker is paid below their
reference wage. As such, Eliaz and Spiegler’s (2014) model suggests that the more a contract is incomplete,
the greater is the adverse effect of wage cuts on output.
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tion, loss aversion implies that whether wages are adjusted crucially depends on the size
and sign of labour demand shocks: for small shocks around the steady state, wages are
completely rigid (both upward and downward); for large shocks, wages are either downward
rigid, or relatively downward sluggish, or upward flexible.
Finally, note that the models by Benjamin (2015), Sliwka and Werner (2017) and Mac-
era and te Velde (2018), discussed above, also incorporate loss aversion into the worker’s
preferences.25 However, only Benjamin (2015) studies downward wage rigidity (see discus-
sion below), while Sliwka and Werner (2017) and Macera and te Velde (2018) do not analyse
the implications of loss aversion for dynamic downward wage rigidity, wage compression
and hiring, which is the main contribution of our paper.
4.4 The reference ‘fair’ wage
Another important element of our model is the adaptation of the worker’s reference wage
to the past wage. This assumption is consistent with a large body of evidence documented
in the labour market literature on reference wage formation as well as by other behavioural
science sub-disciplines concerned with reference point formation.
The first piece of evidence supporting the idea that past wage contracts serve as a ref-
erence for fairness judgements in the labour market comes from the seminal experiment of
Kahneman et al. (1986). This finding has been rapidly coupled with the psychological no-
tion of adaptation, or habituation, popular in social psychology (see Kahneman and Thaler
(1991) and Baucells and Sarin (2010) for a review of this early literature). Adaptation to
past wage contracts is also supported by several anthropological studies (see the survey of
Bewley (2007)). In every firm interviewed, regardless of the country or industry of origin,
compensation managers believe that past wage contracts are important determinants of
workers’ wage entitlements, and that workers rapidly adapt to what they are paid. In the
context of experimental studies, indirect evidence in support of this hypothesis comes from
the field experiments of Gneezy and List (2006) and Mas (2006), and the laboratory exper-
iments of Clark et al. (2010), Ga¨chter and Tho¨ni (2010) and Koch (2017) among others.
25However notice that in contrast to our framework, in the model of Benjamin (2015) workers are loss
averse in their wage and effort domains, and in Macera and te Velde (2018) workers also exhibit loss
aversion when the firm’s profit decreases relative to a reference profit level.
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Direct evidence of reference wage adaptation and its effect on the dynamics of positive
reciprocity has also been documented by the field experiment of Chemin and Kurmann
(2014) and the laboratory experiment of Sliwka and Werner (2017). Moreover, the idea
that ex-ante contracts serve as entitlements for future renegotiations was advanced by Hart
and Moore (2008) and further explored in Herweg and Schmidt (2012) in the literature on
incomplete contracts. The laboratory experiments of Fehr et al. (2011, 2014), Bartling and
Schmidt (2015) and Herz and Taubinsky (2018) provide strong support for this hypothesis.
Taken together this evidence identifies the past wage as one of the most plausible
candidates for a worker’s reference wage, pointing to the existence of a dynamic adaptation
of wage entitlements over time. That said, there are other plausible determinants of the
reference wage that may differ depending on whether the worker is a new hire (in period
0) or an incumbent (in period 1). For instance a newly hired worker’s reference wage r0
could be influenced by the state of the labour market (as in the efficiency wage tradition,
e.g. Akerlof (1982) and Summers (1988)), the most recent wage contract paid in the
previous employment relationship (as considered in Koenig et al. (2014)), or the wage
of incumbent workers employed by the same firm (as the “equal treatment” hypothesis
of Snell and Thomas (2010) would suggest). On the other hand an existing/incumbent
worker’s reference wage r1 might be influenced by the wage of his peers outside the firm
(as in Keynes (1936), Bhaskar (1990) or Driscoll and Holden (2004)), by expectations (as
in Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) and Macera and te Velde (2018)) or by the firm’s ability to
pay (as in Danthine and Kurmann (2007)). We take a simple approach in this article that
nevertheless generates predictions in line with stylised facts, but a very interesting direction
for future research is to gain further understanding of what influences the reference wage in
a labour market setting, and determine whether or not adaptation is symmetric for wage
increases and reductions.
4.5 Models of dynamic downward wage rigidity
A key contribution of our paper is to provide a transparent, and plausible, microfounda-
tion for downward wage rigidity in a dynamic environment. The crucial role that wage
rigidity plays in the understanding of business cycles and labour market fluctuations has
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contributed to the development of a rich set of theoretical models of wage rigidity/stickiness
throughout the history of macroeconomics.26 While a complete review of this literature is
beyond the scope of the present paper, we focus the discussion that follows on theoretical
models of downward wage rigidity that: i) can reproduce, or are consistent with, observed
empirical distributions of wage changes; ii) generate downward wage rigidity in a dynamic
environment; and iii) are based on well-documented stylised facts on the behaviour of
workers and firms engaged in employment relationships. We believe these features to be
important for a microeconomic theory that aims to provide a plausible account of firms’
wage setting behaviour and observed wage dynamics.
As also pointed out by Snell et al. (2018, p. 8), there are few models of wage setting that
can generate wage dynamics consistent with i) and ii) above. We highlighted in Section
3.1 that a necessary ingredient for this is an asymmetric adjustment cost around the past
wage: the marginal cost of cutting the wage (in terms of effort) needs to be larger than
the marginal benefit of increasing it. Indeed, for this asymmetry to be always present in
a dynamic environment it is also necessary for it to be centered around the past wage.
In our model these features are captured by the worker’s asymmetric reference-dependent
reciprocity combined with the dynamic adaptation of the reference wage to past wage
contracts, consistent with point iii) above.
Models of wage setting that generate dynamic downward wage rigidity are those of Elsby
(2009), Holden and Wulfsberg (2009), Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) and Kaur (2018). However,
while being informed by the large body of literature on loss aversion and reciprocity, they
all consider reduced-form functions to characterise the behaviour of workers: both Elsby
(2009) and Kaur (2018) consider a reduced-form effort function with a kink at the past
wage; Holden and Wulfsberg (2009) consider a utility function that exhibits a kink at the
point where the wage is equal to the past wage; and Eliaz and Spiegler (2014) consider a
reduced-form production function in which output falls disproportionately if wages are set
below the worker’s lagged -expectations about the wage. Dynamic downward wage rigidity
26To avoid confusion, we define wage rigidity as the acyclical behaviour of wages, i.e. when wages do not
adjust to shocks (downward/upward or both); while wage stickiness is defined as a less than proportional
cyclicality of wages with respect to shocks. In the literature these terms have been used interchangeably,
sometimes referring to the latter and sometimes to the former. An excellent and comprehensive survey of
earlier theories of wage rigidity/stickyness can be found in Bewley (1999), while more recent surveys are
present in, for instance, Babecky´ et al. (2010) and Rogerson and Shimer (2011).
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is also a feature of the inequity-aversion model of Benjamin (2015) once loss aversion—in
the domain of wages and effort—is introduced on the worker’s side. However, despite this
implying that inequity-aversion per se is not enough to explain downward wage rigidity in
a dynamic environment, as we also discussed in footnotes 13 and 22 the model of Benjamin
is not entirely consistent with points i) and iii) listed above.
The model presented here provides a micro foundation—based on loss aversion, asym-
metric reciprocity and reference wage adaptation—that supports dynamic downward wage
rigidity and is consistent with points i), ii) and iii).
5 Conclusion
Inspired by evidence from anthropological and experimental research on labour markets, in
this paper we have advanced a microeconomic theory of asymmetric reciprocity and opti-
mal wage setting based on contractual incompleteness, fairness, and reference dependence
and loss aversion in the evaluation of wage contracts by workers. This approach allows us to
rigorously formalise several aspects of wage and effort dynamics, and to study their implica-
tions for the nature of the employment contract within a plausible and tractable model. By
establishing a clear link between assumptions and conclusions, our theory provides novel
insights to explain the observed asymmetry and dynamics of workers’ reciprocity, and to
identify the sources of downward wage rigidity, wage compression and hiring incentives.
We formally characterise a worker’s effort response to wage changes to be reference
dependent, where positive and negative reciprocity are defined as relative deviations from
normal effort, and loss aversion is identified as the psychological foundation for the stronger
intensity of negative reciprocity. In addition, we show that the reference-dependent nature
of reciprocity, combined with adaptation, leads to a dynamic ‘re-normalisation’ of effort
throughout the employment relationship: reciprocity is a temporary phenomenon. This
prediction is consistent with the recent experimental findings of Sliwka and Werner (2017)
and with other evidence documented in the field (e.g. Mas (2006) and Gneezy and List
(2006)).
By subsequently analysing the implications of our theory of asymmetric reference-
dependent reciprocity for optimal wage setting in a two-period environment, we establish
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that downward wage rigidity is an inherent feature of the employment contract; and we
identify an asymmetric adjustment cost around the past wage to be a necessary ingredient
for models of dynamic downward wage rigidity. In our model this mechanism is generated
by the worker’s adaptation of the reference wage and the relatively large cost of negative
reciprocity in response to wage cuts (that stems from loss aversion). As such we think of
our model as a general and plausible micro-foundation for downward wage rigidity in a
dynamic environment.
When analysing the consequences of these wage and effort dynamics for the optimal
employment contract, we draw new conclusions about their implications for a forward-
looking firm’s wage compression incentive (Elsby, 2009), and for the expected value of
the employment relationship, which influences hiring decisions. We find that the pri-
mary behavioural mechanism that generates wage compression is the anticipation of the
worker’s re-normalisation of effort due to adaptation, even absent downward wage rigidity.
In a model in which layoffs are endogenous to optimal wage setting, the expectation of
downward wage rigidity may not necessarily lead to wage compression. Nevertheless, inde-
pendently of how the hiring wage adjusts, the anticipation of stronger negative reciprocity
and the expectation of downward wage rigidity unambiguously reduces the expected value
of the employment relationship, implying that a firm that expects to be constrained by
downward wage rigidity in the future will hire less on average.
The framework developed in this paper lends itself as a tractable benchmark model
for the analysis of reference-dependent reciprocity, adaptation and wage rigidity, and their
effect on wage setting and hiring behaviour. We have identified two extensions. First,
it will be interesting to analyse the model predictions under different specifications of a
worker’s reference wage. We chose the past wage as the only determinant of an incumbent
worker’s reference wage as it is the most corroborated hypothesis in the empirical literature.
However, like every model based on reference dependence, predictions are sensitive to the
choice of reference point and investigating if, and how, our conclusions might change is the
natural next step. Second, we believe that exploring the insights of the model within a
richer macroeconomic framework can shed new light on the effects of expected wage rigidity
in long-term employment relationships for job creation and wage dynamics (see Fongoni
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(2018b) for a first step into this direction). As discussed in Elsby et al. (2015) this aspect
is not yet settled in the theory of labour market fluctuations, and has drawn particular
attention in light of recent cross-country experiences following the Great Recession (Elsby
et al., 2016). Therefore, a promising line of future research lies in developing and combining
these two extensions.
Appendix: Additional Material
Deriving the worker’s participation constraint
We want to derive an expression for the worker’s reservation wage defining their partici-
pation constraint. In our model this is the wage below which a worker will optimally turn
down a job offer and stay unemployed in period 0, or quit the job and move to unem-
ployment in period 1. Denote by Wt(wt, rt) the value of the employment relationship to
the worker in period t and normalise the value of being unemployed to zero. The worker’s
reservation wage in each period can be defined as: w(rt, qt) = {0, wt : Wt(wt, rt) = 0}.
By noting that the worker’s decision to turn down a job offer would be made after
observing the optimal wage contract set by the firm, and considering that r1 = w˜0 due
to adaptation, we can express the value of the two-period employment relationship to the
worker as
W0(w˜(r0, q0), r0) = u0(e˜(w˜(r0, q0), r0, λ); w˜(r0, q0), r0)
+ γ
∫ ∞
q(w˜(r0,q0),λ)
W1(w˜(w˜(r0, q0), q1), w˜(r0, q0)) dF (q1|q0),
where γ is the worker’s discount factor and the optimal wage has been denoted here by
w˜(rt, qt) (i.e. excluding the other time-invariant functional arguments to ease notation).
This expression can then be used to derive the reservation wage w(rt, qt) for each t = {0, 1},
the effect of which is to add an additional threshold to the model.
However, note that the reservation wage in each period will be a function of exogenous
variables only, i.e. the initial reference wage r0 and the initial match productivity q0.
Hence it would be straightforward to impose a condition on these such that the worker’s
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participation constraint is never binding. While doing so will not affect the results presented
in this paper, the modelling of this condition might be relevant in a richer framework in
which the worker’s initial reference wage is endogenous, and, in particular, dependant on
the state of the labour market.
Appendix: Proofs
Proof of Theorem 1. We suppose Assumptions W1-W3 hold throughout. To begin note
that if the wage is too low, w < w˜(r, λ), defined such that −d′(0) + n(w˜(r, λ)|r) = 0,
the worker would want to choose negative effort but is constrained not to do so. Hence
for w ≤ w˜(r, λ) we define e˜(w, r, λ) ≡ 0, and so long as w > w˜(r, λ) optimal effort will
be strictly positive, a sufficient condition for which is |d′(0)| > ληm(r), which we assume
to be the case throughout. So long as w > w˜(r, λ) optimal effort is given by the inverse
function e˜(w, r, λ) = d
′−1(n(w|r)) which exists since d′ is strictly monotonic. Since d′
is a continuous function and n(w|r) varies continuously in w and r, e˜(w, r, λ) will be a
continuous function of w and r, but it will not be continuously differentiable everywhere
as, recalling its definition from (4), n(w|r) has a kink at w = r. For w 6= r we can apply
the inverse function theorem to give
e˜w(w, r, λ) =

ηm′(w)
d′′(e)
if w > r
ληm′(w)
d′′(e)
if w < r
so e˜w(w, r, λ) > 0 for all w 6= r, and it then follows that
e˜ww(w, r, λ) =

ηm′′(w)
d′′(e)
if w > r
ληm′′(w)
d′′(e)
if w < r
so e˜ww(w, r, λ) < 0 for all w 6= r.
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By appealing to the definition of normal effort when w = r, we can deduce that
lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− = − lim
ǫ→0
ληm′(r − ǫ)
d′′(e˜(r − ǫ, r, λ)−)
= −
ληm′(r)
d′′(e˜n)
= −λ lim
ǫ→0
ηm′(r + ǫ)
d′′(e˜(r + ǫ, r)+)
= λ lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r + ǫ, r)
+.
Hence the effort function kinks to a flatter slope as the wage increases. Note that this,
combined with the deduction that e˜ww < 0 for all w 6= r, implies e˜w is everywhere decreasing
in w, i.e. the effort function is concave.
The inverse function theorem and the definition of n(w|r) can then be used to deduce
the remainder of the claims:
e˜r(w, r, λ) =
 −
ηm′(r)
d′′(e)
if w > r
−ληm
′(r)
d′′(e)
if w < r
so e˜r(w, r, λ) < 0 for all w 6= r,
e˜λ(w, r, λ) =
 0 if w > rη[m(w)−m(r)]
d′′(e)
< 0 if w < r
and so for w < r
e˜wλ(w, r, λ) =
ηm′(w)
d′′(e)
> 0.
Proof of Theorem 2. Throughout the proof we assume the worker’s productivity and refer-
ence wage are such that q ≥ q(r, λ) so the firm will be profitable if it hires the worker, and
consider the properties of the threshold productivity at the end. We proceed by first stat-
ing some preliminaries, then considering the productivity thresholds, then demonstrating
the nature of the optimal wage setting rule.
Preliminaries : To ease notational burden denote the left-hand side of the first-order
condition (7), i.e. the marginal profit, by Ψ(w; q, r, λ). First, note that under Assumption
F2 and the results of Theorem 1, for w 6= r we have that Ψq(w; q, r, λ) = yqee˜w > 0;
Ψr(w; q, r, λ) = yeee˜re˜w + yee˜wr ≥ 0 (after noting that e˜wr = 0); and Ψw(w; q, r, λ) =
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yee[e˜w]
2 + yee˜ww < 0. In addition, Ψλ = yeee˜λe˜w + yee˜wλ so Ψλ > 0 if w < r and Ψλ = 0 if
w > r. These results also allow us to deduce that if λ > 1, Ψ(w; q, r, λ) jumps down at the
reference wage, since
lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r − ǫ; q, r, λ)− lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r + ǫ; q, r, λ) =
ye(q, lim
ǫ→0
e˜(r − ǫ, r, λ)−) lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− − s′(r − ǫ)
− ye(q, lim
ǫ→0
e˜(r + ǫ, r)+) lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r + ǫ, r)
+ + s′(r + ǫ)
= ye(q, e˜n)[lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− − lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r + ǫ, r)
+]
= ye(q, e˜n) lim
ǫ→0
e˜w(r + ǫ, r)
+[λ− 1] ≥ 0,
with a strict inequality if λ > 1. As such, Ψ(w; q, r, λ) is everywhere decreasing in w,
establishing concavity of the firm’s profit function.
Productivity thresholds : The threshold ql(r, λ) identifies the critical match productivity
below which the firm would want to set the wage below the reference wage, and qu(r) is
the match productivity above which the firm would want to compensate the worker more
than the reference wage. The former is the value of q below which profit is decreasing just
below the reference wage (so concavity of profit and the fact that Ψq > 0 imply that for all
q below this, profit will be maximised when w < r); the latter is the value of q above which
profit is increasing just above the reference wage (so concavity of profit and Ψq > 0 imply
that for all q exceeding this, profit will be maximised when w > r). Since Ψ(w, 0, r, λ) < 0
when w > 0 and Ψq > 0 there will be a unique value of each productivity threshold.
We now want to establish some properties of the thresholds. Implicit differentiation
allows us to deduce that
qlr(r, λ) = − lim
ǫ→0
dΨ(r−ǫ;q,r,λ)
dr
Ψq(r − ǫ; q, r, λ)
and
qu′(r) = − lim
ǫ→0
dΨ(r+ǫ;q,r,λ)
dr
Ψq(r + ǫ; q, r, λ)
.
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Now,
dΨ(r ± ǫ; q, r, λ)
dr
= Ψw(r ± ǫ; q, r, λ) + Ψr(r ± ǫ; q, r, λ)
= yee[e˜
±
w ]
2 + yee˜
±
ww + yeee˜
±
r e˜
±
w
= yeee˜
±
w [e˜
±
w + e˜
±
r ] + yee˜
±
ww.
As ǫ→ 0 we can infer that e˜w(r ± ǫ, r, λ)
± + e˜r(r ± ǫ, r, λ)
± → 0 (refer to the expressions
of these objects in the proof of Theorem 1), implying limǫ→0
dΨ(r±ǫ;q,r,λ)
dr
= yee˜
±
ww < 0. This
allows us to conclude that qlr(r, λ) > 0 and q
u′(r) > 0.
Turning next to investigate how the lower threshold depends on the degree of loss
aversion, implicit differentiation gives
qlλ(r, λ) = − lim
ǫ→0
Ψλ(r − ǫ, q, r, λ)
Ψq(r − ǫ, q, r, λ)
= −
yee limǫ→0 e˜λ(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− limǫ→0 e˜w(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− + ye limǫ→0 e˜wλ(r − ǫ, r, λ)
−
limǫ→0Ψq(r − ǫ; q, r, λ)
< 0
since we deduced in Theorem 1 that e˜−λ < 0 and e˜
−
wλ > 0.
The consideration of limǫ→0Ψ(r− ǫ; q, rλ)− limǫ→0Ψ(r+ ǫ; q, r, λ) in the preliminaries
allows us to conclude that when λ = 1 these two objects are equal. This, combined with the
observation that limǫ→0 e˜(r − ǫ, r, λ)
− = e˜n = limǫ→0 e˜(r + ǫ, r) (from Theorem 1) permits
the conclusion that ql(r, 1) = qu(r). This, along with the fact that qlλ(r, λ) < 0, implies
ql(r, λ) < qu(r) for all λ > 1.
Optimal wage setting : We now turn to the optimal wage setting rule, which depends
on the match productivity in relation to the productivity thresholds.
If q ∈ [q(r, λ), ql(r, λ)) then the definition of ql(r, λ) and fact that Ψq > 0 can be used
to deduce that limǫ→0Ψ(r − ǫ, q, r, λ) < 0; since Ψ(w; q, r, λ) is everywhere decreasing in
w, the same is true for all w ≥ r. As such, the optimising wage must satisfy w < r and
will therefore be the solution to
ye(q, e˜(w, r, λ)
−)e˜w(w, r, λ)
− − s′(w) ≤ 0,
with equality if w > w˜(r, λ) (recall from the proof of Theorem 1 that this is the wage below
39
which effort takes the boundary value of zero). To account for the fact that the firm may
pay the ‘lowest feasible wage’ for a range of match productivity, let q˘(r, λ) = max{0, q :
Ψ(w˜(r, λ); q, r, λ) = 0} (at q˘(r, λ) the firm would want to pay w˜(r, λ) and since Ψq > 0 the
same will be true for all 0 ≤ q < q˘(r, λ)). For all q˘(r, λ) < q < ql(r, λ) the optimal wage
is given by the displayed first-order condition holding with equality, which is denoted by
w˜(r, q, λ)−. Implicit differentiation and our deductions in the preliminaries reveal
w˜q(r, q, λ)
− = −
Ψq
Ψw
> 0,
w˜r(r, q, λ)
− = −
Ψr
Ψw
≥ 0, and
w˜λ(r, q, λ)
− = −
Ψλ
Ψw
> 0.
If q ∈ (qu(r),∞) then the definition of qu(r) and the fact that Ψq > 0 can be used to
deduce that limǫ→0Ψ(r + ǫ, q, r, λ) > 0; since Ψ(w; q, r, λ) is everywhere decreasing in w
the same is true for all w ≤ r and, as such, the optimising wage must exceed r and will
therefore satisfy
ye(q, e˜(w, r)
+)e˜w(w, r)
+ − s′(w) = 0.
Letting w˜(q, r)+ denote the solution (which is independent of λ), implicit differentiation
gives
w˜q(r, q)
+ > 0 and
w˜r(r, q)
+ ≥ 0.
If q ∈ [ql(r, λ), qu(r)] then the fact that Ψq > 0 can be used to deduce that limǫ→0Ψ(r−
ǫ, q, r, λ) ≥ 0 and limǫ→0Ψ(r + ǫ, q, r, λ) ≤ 0. That Ψw < 0 for all w 6= r then implies
Ψ(w; q, r, λ) > 0 for all w < r and Ψ(w; q, r, λ) < 0 for all w > r, implying profit is
maximised if and only if w = r.
Finally, if q < q(r, λ) then then the employment relationship ends. Implicit differentia-
tion of the zero profit condition defining the reservation productivity allows us to deduce
40
that
q
r
(r, λ) = −
ye[e˜r + e˜ww˜r]− s
′w˜r
yq + yee˜ww˜q − s′w˜q
= −
w˜r[yee˜w − s
′] + yee˜r
w˜q[yee˜w − s′] + yq
> 0
since yee˜w − s
′ = 0 from the first-order condition, yq, ye > 0 by Assumption F2 and we
found in Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0. In addition,
q
λ
(r, λ) = −
ye[e˜λ + e˜ww˜λ]− s
′w˜λ
yq + yee˜ww˜q − s′w˜q
= −
w˜λ[yee˜w − s
′] + yee˜λ
w˜q[yee˜w − s′] + yq
.
Again yee˜w − s
′ = 0 and yq, ye > 0, and we found in Theorem 1 that when w > r e˜ is
independent of λ, but when w < r, e˜λ < 0. As such, if w˜(r, q(r, λ), λ) > r then qλ(r, λ) = 0
but if w˜(r, q(r, λ), λ) < r, q
λ
(r, λ) > 0.
Proof of Proposition 1. Recall that J1(w0, q1)
−;=;+ represents the continuation value of the
employment relationship when w1 < w0;w1 = w0;w1 > w0, in which effort is given by
e˜(w1, w0, λ)
−; e˜n; e˜(w1, w0)
+. The marginal effect of a wage increase in period 0, which
becomes the worker’s reference wage in period 1, on the expected continuation value of the
employment relationship to the firm is given by (where dF ≡ dF (q1|q0)):
∂
∂r1
∫ ∞
q(w0,λ)
J1(w0, q1) dF =
∫ ql(w0,λ)
q(w0,λ)
J1,r1(w0, q1)
− dF − q
r
J1(w0, q)f(q|q0)
+ qlr lim
ǫ→0
J1(w0, q
l − ǫ)−f(ql|q0) +
∫ qu(w0)
ql(w0,λ)
J1,r1(w0, q1)
= dF
− qlr lim
ǫ→0
J1(w0, q
l)=f(ql|q0) + q
u′ lim
ǫ→0
J1(w0, q
u)=f(qu|q0)
+
∫ ∞
qu(w0)
J1,r1(w0, q1)
+ dF − qu′ lim
ǫ→0
J1(w0, q
u + ǫ)−f(qu|q0).
By definition, J1(w0, q) = 0, and the continuity of the optimal effort function and wage
imply limǫ→0 J1(w0, q
l− ǫ)− = J1(w0, q
l)= and limǫ→0 J1(w0, q
u+ ǫ)+ = J1(w0, q
u)=. Hence,
the derivatives with respect to the integral limits ql and qu cancel each other out, which
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yields:
∫ ∞
q(w0,λ)
J1,r1(w0, q1) dF =
∫ ql(w0,λ)
q(w0,λ)
J1,r1(w0, q1)
− dF +
∫ qu(w0)
ql(w0,λ)
J1,r1(w0, q1)
= dF
+
∫ ∞
qu(w0)
J1,r1(w0, q1)
+ dF
Now, for q1 ∈ [q(w0, λ),∞) \ [q
l(w0, λ), q
u(w0)] (i.e. where w 6= r):
J1,r1(r1, q1)
± = yee˜
±
ww˜
±
r + yee˜
±
r − s
′w˜±r
= w˜±r [yee˜
±
w − s
′] + yee˜
±
r
= yee˜
±
r < 0,
since from the first-order condition yee˜
±
w−s
′ = 0 and we deduced in Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0.
For q1 ∈ [q
l(w0, λ), q
u(w0)] (i.e. where w = r and optimal effort is e˜
n):
J1,r1(r1, q1)
= = πw = −s
′(w0) < 0.
As such,
∫ ∞
q(w0,λ)
J1,r1(w0, q1) dF =
∫ ql
q
yee˜
−
r dF −
∫ qu
ql
s′ dF +
∫ ∞
qu
yee˜
+
r dF < 0; (14)
which corresponds to our definition of Φ(w0, λ).
Proof of Theorem 3. The proof is qualitatively similar to the proof of Theorem 2, so the
details are largely omitted. Let us, however, dwell on the condition that
Ψw + δΦw0 < 0
establishing concavity of the value function in w0. We know from the proof of Theorem 2
that Ψ(w; q0, r0, λ) is decreasing in w, as Ψw < 0 for w 6= r and at w = r there is a jump
down. Recalling the expression for Φ(w0, λ) in (14) and recognising that both the integrand
(except in the case of q1 ∈ [q
l(w0, λ), q
u(w0)]) and the limits of integration depend on w0,
42
we deduce that
Φw0 =
∫ ql
q
d
dr
{yee˜r} dF − qryee˜rf(q|q0) + q
l
rye lim
ǫ→0
e˜r(w0 − ǫ, w0, λ)f(q
l|q0)
+ qlrs
′f(ql|q0)− q
u′s′f(qu|q0)
− qu′ye lim
ǫ→0
e˜r(w0 + ǫ, w0, λ)f(q
u|q0) +
∫ ∞
qu
d
dr
{yee˜r} dF.
Now, from the expressions for e˜w and e˜r in the proof of Theorem 1 it follows that limǫ→0 e˜r(w0±
ǫ, w0, λ) = − limǫ→0 e˜w(w0 ± ǫ, w0, λ). Moreover, when w 6= r the first-order condition
holds with equality, which implies that yee˜w − s
′ = 0. These statements together give
us ye limǫ→0 e˜r(w0 ± ǫ, w0, λ) + s
′ = 0, which allows several terms to cancel in the above
expression. Noting that d
dr
{yee˜r} = yee˜rr + yee[e˜r]
2 then allows us to conclude that
Φw0 =
∫ ql
q
[yee˜rr + yee[e˜r]
2] dF +
∫ ∞
qu
[yee˜rr + yee[e˜r]
2] dF − q
r
yee˜rf(q|q0).
Hence, after noticing that e˜rr = −e˜ww and collecting this term as the common factor, we
can rewrite the expression Ψw + δΦw0 as:
e˜ww
{
ye − δ
[∫ ql
q
ye dF +
∫ ∞
qu
ye dF
]}
+ yee[e˜w]
2 + δ
[∫ ql
q
yee[e˜r]
2 dF +
∫ ∞
qu
yee[e˜r]
2 dF
]
− δq
r
yee˜rf(q|q0). (15)
We know from Theorem 1 that e˜r < 0 and e˜ww < 0, and from Theorem 2 that qr > 0.
This implies that: the first line in the expression above is negative only if the term in curly
brackets is positive; the second line is negative; and the last line is positive.
The term in curly brackets captures the difference between the ‘current’ and the ‘ex-
pected discounted future’ marginal effect of effort on output (i.e. the effect of a greater
reciprocity today, due to a higher wage, versus lower reciprocity in the future, due to a
higher reference wage); while the last line captures the marginal increase in the firm’s
lay-off reservation productivity, which reduces the support of the distribution over which
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the firm will employ a worker with a higher reference wage in the subsequent employ-
ment period. As such we can deduce that if the current effect of reciprocity dominates
the expected discounted future effect of reciprocity on the firm’s value of the employment
relationship, and if the firm’s lay-off reservation productivity does not increase too much,
then expression (15) will be negative, as required.
Nevertheless, under Assumption D3 this deduction always holds and the proof of the
nature of the optimal wage follows the same steps as the proof of Theorem 2 where Ψ is
replaced with Ψ + δΦ.
Proof of Proposition 2. The proof relies on investigation of the first-order condition of the
two optimisation problems, noting from Proposition 1 that Φ(w0, λ) < 0. First we show
that qˆl(r, λ, δ) > q˜l(r, λ). Suppose, by contradiction, that qˆl ≤ q˜l, then the fact that Ψq > 0
(see the preliminaries in the proof of Theorem 2) implies
0 ≡ lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r − ǫ; q˜l, r, λ) ≥ lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r − ǫ, qˆl, r, λ),
but then since Φ(w, λ) < 0 we have that
lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r − ǫ, qˆl, r, λ) > lim
ǫ→0
Ψ(r − ǫ, qˆl, r, λ) + δΦ(w, λ) ≡ 0,
yielding a contradiction. That qˆu(r, λ, δ) > q˜u(r) is similarly proved.
We now want to compare wˆ(r, q, λ, δ)−;+ with w˜(r, q, λ)−;+ where both functions are
defined. We demonstrate that wˆ(r, q, λ, δ)− < w˜(r, q, λ)− for all q < q˜l(r, λ). Suppose, by
contradiction, that wˆ− ≥ w˜−. Then the fact that Ψw < 0 (see the preliminaries in the
proof of Theorem 2) implies
0 ≡ Ψ(w˜−; q, r, λ) ≥ Ψ(wˆ−; q, r, λ),
but then Φ(w0, λ) < 0 implies
Ψ(wˆ−; q, r, λ) > Ψ(wˆ−; q, r, λ) + δΦ(r, λ) ≡ 0,
yielding a contradiction. The proof that wˆ(r, q, λ, δ)+ < w˜(r, q, λ)+ for all q > qˆu(r, λ, δ) is
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similar and so omitted.
Proof of Proposition 3. Consider how the optimal wage changes with the degree of loss
aversion. Implicit differentiation of the wage setting rule gives
wˆλ = −
Ψλ + δΦλ
Ψw + δΦw
.
By Assumption D3 the denominator is negative, and we know from the preliminaries in
the proof of Theorem 2 that Ψλ = 0 if w ≥ r and Ψλ > 0 if w < r. Recalling the definition
of Φ(w0, λ) in (14) and noting that πw and q
u are independent of λ, we deduce that
Φλ =
∫ ql
q
d
dλ
{yee˜r} dF − qλyee˜rf(q|q0)
+ qlλye lim
ǫ→0
e˜r(w0 − ǫ, w0, λ)f(q
l|q0) + q
l
λs
′f(ql|q0) +
∫ ∞
qu
d
dλ
{yee˜r} dF.
Now, the derivatives with respect to the integral limits cancel out since as we deduced
previously ye limǫ→0 e˜r(w0− ǫ, w0, λ) + s
′ = 0. Moreover, d
dλ
{yee˜r} = yeee˜λe˜r + yee˜rλ which,
according to our deductions in Theorem 1, is equal to zero for wages exceeding the reference
wage. As such,
Φλ =
∫ ql
q
[yeee˜λe˜r + yee˜rλ] dF − qλyee˜rf(q|q0).
In Theorem 1 we concluded that e˜λ, e˜r, e˜rλ < 0 and we know from Theorem 2 that qλ > 0.
As such, the sign of Φλ remains undetermined, so we cannot sign Ψλ + δΦλ, but rather
conclude that wλ R 0 ⇔ Ψλ + δΦλ R 0. Note that if the layoff reservation productivity
does not increase too much, i.e. q
λ
yee˜rf(q|q0) is sufficiently small, then Φλ < 0.
Proof of Proposition 4. The reservation productivity governing hiring behaviour in the ini-
tial contract is characterised by
qˆ(r0, λ, δ) = max{0, q0 : π(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), r0, q0, λ) + δE[J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1)] = 0}.
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Implicit differentiation reveals
dqˆ
dλ
= −
ye[e˜wwˆλ + e˜λ]− s
′wˆλ + δ
dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]
dλ
yq + yee˜wwˆq0 − s
′wˆq0 + δ
dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]
dq0
= −
yee˜λ + wˆλ[yee˜w − s
′] + δ dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]
dλ
yq + wˆq0 [yee˜w − s
′] + δ dE0[J1(wˆ(r0,q0,λ,δ),q1)]
dq0
. (16)
Letting π−;=;+ be the profit function when w1 < w0;w1 = w0;w1 > w0, in which effort
is given by e˜(w1, w0, λ)
−; e˜n; e˜(w1, w0)
+, we have
dE0[J1]
dλ
=
∫ ql
q
dπ−
dλ
dF −
dq
dλ
π−|q=qf(q|q0) +
dql
dλ
π−|q=qlf(q
l|q0)
+
∫ qu
ql
dπ=
dλ
dF +
dqu
dλ
π=|q=quf(q
u|q0)−
dql
dλ
π=|q=qlf(q
l|q0)
+
∫ ∞
qu
dπ+
dλ
dF −
dqu
dλ
π+|q=quf(q
u|q0).
Noting that π−|q=q ≡ 0, and that since π
−,+|q=ql = π
= and π−,+|q=qu = π
=, the other
effects on the limits of integration cancel out, this reduces to
dE0[J1]
dλ
=
∫ ql
q
dπ−
dλ
dF +
∫ qu
ql
dπ=
dλ
dF +
∫ ∞
qu
dπ+
dλ
dF.
Now,
dπ−;+
dλ
= yee˜λ + yee˜ww˜λ + yee˜rwˆλ − s
′w˜λ
= yee˜λ + yee˜rwˆλ + w˜λ [yee˜w − s
′]
= ye[e˜λ + e˜rwˆλ]
since yee˜w − s
′ = 0 by the first-order condition. However, within the range of rigidity we
have
dπ=
dλ
= −s′wˆλ.
Note that wˆλ doesn’t depend on q1 and e˜λ = 0 when the wage exceeds the reference wage.
46
Then, recalling the expression for Φ(w0, λ) in (14), we have that
dE0[J1]
dλ
=
∫ ql
q
ye[e˜λ + e˜rwˆλ] dF −
∫ qu
ql
s′wˆλ dF +
∫ ∞
qu
yee˜rwˆλ dF
=
∫ ql
q
yee˜λ dF + wˆλ
∫ ql
q
yee˜r dF − wˆλ
∫ qu
ql
s′ dF + wˆλ
∫ ∞
qu
yee˜r dF
= wˆλΦ +
∫ ql
q
yee˜λ dF.
This allows us to write the expression for the numerator in (16) as
yee˜λ + wˆλ[yee˜w − s
′] + δ
dE0[J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1)]
dλ
= wˆλ[yee˜w − s
′ + δΦ] + yee˜λ + δ
∫ ql
q
yee˜λdF
= yee˜λ + δ
∫ ql
q
yee˜λdF
since the first-order condition for the initial wage implies yee˜w − s
′ + δΦ = 0.
Similar deductions allow us to conclude that dE0[J1]
dq0
= wˆq0Φ, and therefore to write the
expression for the denominator in (16) as
yq + wˆq0 [yee˜w − s
′] + δ
dE0[J1(wˆ(r0, q0, λ, δ), q1)]
dq0
= wˆq0 [yee˜w − s
′ + δΦ] + yq
= yq.
As such,
dqˆ
dλ
= −
yee˜λ + δ
∫ ql
q
yee˜λdF
yq
> 0
since we know from Theorem 1 that when w < r, then e˜λ < 0.
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